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Recent Innovations in Treasury Cash Management
Kenneth D. Garbade, John C. Partlan, and Paul J. Santoro
The Treasury Tax and Loan program, a joint undertaking of the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve, is designed to manage federal tax receipts and stabilize the supply of reserves in the 
banking system. Three recent innovations—electronic collection of business taxes, real-time 
investment of excess Treasury balances, and competitive bidding for Treasury deposits—
have materially enhanced the ability of the two agencies to achieve these objectives.
T
he U.S. government is the largest transactor 
in the world. During fiscal year 2003, aggre-
gate federal receipts and expenditures averaged 
$18.8 billion daily. Money was disbursed to pay for pur-
chases of goods and services,civilian and military salaries,
transfer payments such as social security,and interest on the
national debt.Receipts came primarily from personal and
corporate income taxes and social security contributions.
Like other economic agents,the U.S.Treasury maintains
a cash balance to buffer unanticipated and short-run differ-
ences between receipts and expenditures. Unlike other
agents,however,the Treasury has to pay special attention
to the question of whereit keeps its cash.The Treasury dis-
burses almost all of its payments from accounts at Federal
Reserve Banks,but virtually all Treasury receipts are trans-
fers of funds previously held at private institutions.Thus,
there is a continuous flow of funds from private institu-
tions to the Reserve Banks and back again.If the Treasury
deposited all of its receipts in its Reserve Bank accounts as
soon as the receipts came in, and if it held the funds in
those accounts until they were disbursed,increases in its
cash position would drain reserves from the banking system
and,conversely,decreases would add reserves.As Chart 1
shows,Treasury balances exhibit significant trends,build-
ing up when receipts exceed disbursements and running
down when disbursements exceed receipts.Maintaining
Treasury balances primarily at Federal Reserve Banks
would,therefore,necessitate frequent and large-scale open
market operations to mitigate undesirable fluctuations in
bank reserves and the federal funds rate.1A more efficient
strategy,and the one adopted by the Treasury,is to main-
tain a stable working balance in its Reserve Bank accounts
and to leave the remainder of its cash in private depository
institutions until needed.
Dampening fluctuations in aggregate bank reserves by
stabilizing Treasury balances at Federal Reserve Banks was
the original purpose of the Treasury Tax and Loan (TT&L)
program,and it remains a primary objective.2At the same
time, the TT&L program is a key component of the
Treasury’s fiscal management system and serves two addi-
tional purposes related to that system: processing federal
tax payments and earning interest on public funds invested
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at private depository institutions.The program lies at the
interface between Federal Reserve monetary policy and
Treasury cash management and provides an outstanding
example of the benefits,to taxpayers and to the economy as a
whole, of the long-standing cooperation between the two
agencies.
This edition of Current Issues examines three recent inno-
vations in the TT&L program that have materially enhanced
the ability ofTreasury and Federal Reserve officials to achieve
the objectives ofthe program.Understanding the innovations
is important not only because the TT&L program is instru-
mental in carrying out monetary policy and federal cash
management,but also because the innovations shed light on
why and how public sector innovation occurs. We begin 
by describing the broad structure of the TT&L program,
including the program’s role in the implementation of mone-
tary policy,and then discuss the three innovations.
An Overview of the Treasury Tax and Loan Program
The key to understanding the TT&L program is understand-
ing the role played by private depository institutions. A
depository institution can participate in any of three ways:
as a collector institution,a retainer institution,or an investor
institution.
Collector institutions are tax collection conduits.They
accept tax payments from businesses (primarily withhold-
ings of personal income taxes, corporate income taxes,
and social security contributions) in electronic form and at
their teller windows and transfer the payments to Treasury
accounts at district Federal Reserve Banks.About a dozen
“lockbox” banks and Internal Revenue Service service 
centers perform a related function:receiving and processing
tax payments sent in by mail.
A retainer institution also accepts tax payments but,
subject to a balance limit specified by the institution and
pledge of sufficient collateral, retains the payments in an
interest-bearing “Main Account” until called for by the
Treasury.If the Main Account balance exceeds the institu-
tion’s balance limit,or if it exceeds the collateral value of the
assets pledged by the institution,the excess is transferred
promptly to a Treasury account at the institution’s district
Federal Reserve Bank.The interest rate on Main Account bal-
ances is prescribed by the secretary of the Treasury to be the
weekly average overnight federal funds rate less 25 basis
points.(Box 1 explains the rationale for this floating rate.)
An investor institution does everything a retainer institu-
tion does and,in addition,accepts discretionary investments
from the Treasury.(The Treasury invests funds that would
otherwise cause its Reserve Bank balance to rise above the
target level.) An investor institution can choose to operate
with one-day notice,in which case it receives one business
day’s notice of a pending investment, or with same-day
notice,in which case it agrees to accept funds either on the
same day it is notified of the investment or on the following 
day. Direct investments are credited to the institution’s 
Main Account and must be collateralized; they earn interest
at the weekly average overnight federal funds rate less 
25 basis points.Table 1 shows direct investments made dur-
ing November 2003.
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A remarkably large number of depository institutions
participate in the TT&L program.At the end of 2003,there
were 11,758 collector institutions,949 retainer institutions,
and 162 investor institutions. During that year, program 
participants processed $1.58 trillion in tax payments.
During fiscal year 2003,the Treasury maintained an average
daily aggregate Main Account balance of $8.9 billion at
retainer and investor institutions.
Treasury Calls
Collector institutions transfer tax payments to Treasury
accounts at Federal Reserve Banks every day,but retainer
and investor institutions retain the payments they receive—
and investor institutions retain the Treasury’s direct invest-
ments—until the Treasury “calls” for the funds. Retainer 
and investor institutions are divided into three classes—
designated A,B,and C—for purposes of Treasury calls.
The smallest institutions, those that process less than
$10 million of tax payments annually,are designated class A
institutions and generally receive at least five business days’
advance notice of a call.Institutions that process between
$10 million and $100 million of tax payments, as well 
as institutions that process more than $100 million of
payments but have deposit liabilities of less than $100 mil-
lion, are designated class B institutions and generally
receive at least three days’notice.Calls to class A and B insti-
tutions are typically issued on a Friday,two or three times a
month,and are usually for either 50 percent or 100 percent
of Main Account balances as of a specified future date.
For example, class A and B institutions were notified on
Friday,November 14,2003,that they were to transfer (on
Wednesday,November 26) 100 percent of the Main Account
balances posted as of the close of business on Tuesday,
November 25 (Table 2,first two highlighted rows).
The largest institutions—those that both process more
than $100 million of tax payments annually and have deposit
liabilities of more than $100 million—are designated class C
institutions.(An institution is also placed in class C if it has a
balance limit of more than $250 million or if it has deposit
liabilities of more than $5 billion.) Calls to class C institu-
tions are issued frequently,sometimes daily,and the institu-
tions receive either one-day or same-day notice.For example,
class C institutions were notified at about 10:45 a.m.
on Monday,November 17,2003,that they were to transfer 
26 percent of their current uncalled Main Account balances
that day and 60 percent of the remaining balances the 
following day (Table 2,third and fourth highlighted rows).
The rate of interest on Main Account balances is the weekly
average overnight federal funds rate less 25 basis points.
(The weekly average rate is computed for a seven-day inter-
val beginning on Thursday and ending the following
Wednesday, with the rate for a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday
taken as the rate for the preceding business day.) This rate
was established in 1978 in the course of a major overhaul 
of the Treasury Tax and Loan program. Treasury officials
concluded that the rate on overnight repurchase agree-
ments (RPs) was an acceptable market-linked rate for 
collateralized balances that provided “recognition [of] costs
of alternative collateralized borrowings by banks and 
[of] the depositaries’ short-term investment potential for
[TT&L balances].”a Since RP rates were not widely
reported in the late 1970s, officials decided that the TT&L
rate should be set at the more familiar federal funds rate less
the 25 basis point average spread between the funds rate
and the RP rate that prevailed at that time.
By the late 1990s, RP rates were widely available and
Treasury officials suggested that the TT&L rate might be
set directly at the overnight RP rate.b However, the average
spread between the federal funds rate and the RP rate had
in the meantime declined to less than 5 basis points, so
changing to the RP rate would have increased the return on
Treasury balances by more than 20 basis points. Not sur-
prisingly, bankers objected. Among other things, they
argued that the 25 basis point spread was necessary and
appropriate compensation for (a) the operational cost of 
collateralizing Treasury balances and (b) the value of the
option granted to the Treasury to call its balances at any
time. More pointedly, some bankers suggested that some
institutions might reduce their participation in the TT&L
program if the Treasury raised the TT&L rate to the RP
rate. This prospect was worrisome because reduced partici-
pation could have impaired the ability of the private sector
to absorb peak Treasury balances. The Treasury decided to
leave the TT&L rate unchanged, but it also began to
develop a mechanism—the Term Investment Option
(described in the text)—for identifying a market rate of
return on its deposits.c
aLovett (1978, p. 44).
bFederal Register, July 30, 1999, pp. 41747-9.
cResponses to the proposal to change the RP rate, together
with the Treasury’s decision to leave the rate unchanged, are
recorded in the Federal Register, March 15, 2002, pp. 11573-7.
Box 1
The Interest Rate on Main Account BalancesWe noted earlier that there were more than 1,100 retainer
and investor institutions in the TT&L program at the end of
2003.These institutions were divided into 461 class A insti-
tutions,472 class B institutions,and 178 class C institutions.
During fiscal year 2003,class A institutions held aggregate
Main Account balances of $74 million at the close of busi-
ness on a typical day,class B institutions held average bal-
ances of $290 million,and class C institutions held average
balances of $8.54 billion.
Maintaining the Target Reserve Bank Balance
At the present time,the Treasury aims to maintain an aggre-
gate Reserve Bank balance of about $7 billion during periods
of heavy and volatile tax flows (in the second half of the
months of January,April,June,and September and briefly in
the middle of March and December) and $5 billion at other
times. Calls and direct investments allow the Treasury to
maintain its Reserve Bank balance fairly close to the target
level on most days (Chart 2).This control is the end result of
a closely timed decision-making process involving Treasury
cash managers and the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.
Each morning before 9:00 a.m.(all times in this article are
eastern time), Treasury cash managers and New York Fed
staffers estimate independently the current day’s tax receipts
from collector institutions and lockbox facilities, other
receipts,and disbursements in a wide variety of categories.
The estimates are combined with the previous day’s closing
Treasury balance at the Reserve Banks,payments of principal
and interest,proceeds from sales of new debt issues,maturing
calls on retainer and investor institutions,and direct invest-
ments scheduled on the preceding business day to produce
pro forma estimates of the current day’s closing Treasury 
balance at the Reserve Banks. The Treasury and Fed staffs
compare their estimates during a 9:00 a.m.conference call
and come to a consensus for that day’s discretionary cash
management action.On most days,the action is based on a
simple average of the two estimates.If the average estimated
closing balance exceeds the target level,the Treasury invests
the excess with investor institutions that have sufficient 
free collateral and room under their balance limits to accept
additional balances (see the figure at the bottom of page 5).
Table 2
Treasury Calls on Main Account Balances Announced 
in November 2003 
Percentage of Amount 
Notice Balance  Transfer Balance to be  Transferred 
Date Date Date Transferred (Millions of Dollars)
Class A Institutions
11/14 11/25 11/26 100 95
11/28 12/8 12/9 100 147
Class B Institutions
11/14 11/25 11/26 100 411
11/21 11/28 12/1 100 170
11/28 12/8 12/9 100 259
Class C Institutions
11/3 11/3 11/3 38 2,804
11/3 11/3 11/4 100 4,499
11/4 11/4 11/4 20 1,015
11/4 11/4 11/5 25 1,032
11/6 11/6 11/7 53 4,512
11/7 11/7 11/7 20 1,301
11/7 11/7 11/10 21 1,039
11/10 11/10 11/10 38 3,121
11/10 11/10 11/12 100 5,080
11/12 11/12 11/12 73 2,111
11/13 11/13 11/13 91 2,427
11/14 11/14 11/14 86 3,346
11/17 11/17 11/17 26 2,132
11/17 11/17 11/18 60 3,673
11/18 11/18 11/19 48 3,352
11/19 11/19 11/20 22 1,530
11/20 11/20 11/20 6 398
11/20 11/20 11/21 69 4,109
11/21 11/21 11/21 27 1,198
11/24 11/24 11/25 59 4,139
11/25 11/25 11/25 34 1,852
11/25 11/25 11/26 72 2,547
11/26 11/26 11/26 27 1,141
11/28 11/28 11/28 21 2,685
11/28 11/28 12/1 100 10,050
Source:Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury Statement, 
<http://www.fms.treas.gov/dts>. 
Chart 2
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If the average estimated closing balance is below target,the
Treasury issues a same-day call to make up the anticipated
shortfall. Box 2 explains how the estimate of the closing
Treasury balance affects Federal Reserve open market opera-
tions later in the same morning. Since discretionary cash
management actions must be based, in part, on imperfect
forecasts of the current day’s receipts and disbursements,
there is always some unexpected variation in Treasury 
balances at the Fed—and hence in reserves available to the
banking system.
Collateral
By law,a retainer or investor institution must pledge collat-
eral against its Main Account balance.The Treasury accepts a
wide variety of assets as collateral,ranging from Treasury
securities to commercial,agricultural,and student loans,
but it assigns a lower collateral value to less liquid and less
creditworthy assets,as well as to assets with more volatile
market prices.3 Collateral must be held either at a Federal
Reserve Bank or at a depository institution that provides
custodial services and is acceptable to the Treasury.
In 1982,the Treasury added a Special Direct Investment
(SDI) facility to the TT&L program to allow depository insti-
tutions to pledge additional types of collateral at times when
Treasury balances are unusually high.The Treasury places
funds with institutions participating in the SDI program 
the same way it places conventional investments:with either
same-day or one-day notice. The key feature of the SDI 
program is that SDI balances can be secured with student
loans, commercial loans, and one-to-four-family whole
mortgages  retained on the premises of the institution.
Retaining possession is important because amortizing
assets such as student loans and whole mortgages can be
cumbersome to administer from remote locations.SDI bal-
ances may be withdrawn with one-day or same-day notice.
The Treasury placed SDI balances with investor institu-
tions during six intervals in 2001,five intervals in 2002,and
two intervals in 2003 (Chart 3).Designed to accommodate
temporary surges in Treasury balances,the facility was used
Every business day at about 9:20 a.m., the Manager of the
System Open Market Account confers with a member of
the Federal Open Market Committee and with staff of the
Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York to decide on open market operations for the day. On
most days, the decision is based primarily on technical 
factors such as anticipated reserve drains due to growth of
currency in circulation and expected additions to reserves
due to increases in float. If reserves are expected to fall
below a level believed to be consistent with the target level
for the overnight federal funds rate, the Fed enters the 
market at about 9:30 a.m. to supply additional reserves by
entering into repurchase agreements with primary dealers.
If reserves are expected to be inappropriately high, the Fed
absorbs reserves with reverse repurchase agreements.
An important part of the decision-making process for
open market operations is anticipating changes in the
Treasury’s Reserve Bank balance, because increases in that
balance drain reserves from the banking system while
decreases in the balance supply reserves. Participants in the
9:20 conference call use the projections developed earlier 
in the morning by Treasury cash managers and staff of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as well as a third
projection developed by Board staff.
Box 2
Treasury Cash Balances at Federal Reserve
Banks and Open Market Operations
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury Statement, 
<http://www.fms.treas.gov/dts>.
Chart 3
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primarily during periods of heavy tax receipts.The Treasury
reduced its use of SDIs in 2003 partly because of lower tax
receipts and partly because it was experimenting with a new
investment program, the Term Investment Option (TIO),
described in the next section.
In spite of the wide variety of assets accepted as collateral
for Main Account balances,and in spite of the overflow ca-
pacity afforded by the Special Direct Investment facility,
the Treasury’s cash position sometimes grows so large that
retainer and investor institutions are unable to absorb 
the entire excess over the target Reserve Bank balance.For 
example, personal and corporate income tax payments
swamped the absorptive capacity of retainer and investor
institutions in late April and early May 2000 and led to extra-
ordinarily large Treasury balances at Federal Reserve Banks
between April 25 and May 2 (Table 3).The ballooning bal-
ances drained reserves from the banking system and forced
the Fed to replenish reserves with open market operations
(reported in the last column of the table).
Recent Innovations in Treasury Cash Management
Evolutionary changes in the national payments system and 
revolutionary changes in telecommunications and information-
processing technologies have created opportunities for the
Treasury to keep Reserve Bank balances closer to target lev-
els, to process taxes at lower cost, and to earn something
closer to a market rate of return on its deposits at private
depository institutions.This section describes three innova-
tions that have drawn upon the emerging opportunities.
An Innovation in Tax Collection
The Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS) is an
innovation in tax collection that has reduced processing
costs,increased the average rate of return on public funds
invested at private depository institutions,and facilitated
maintenance of the Treasury’s Reserve Bank balance closer
to target levels.EFTPS was mandated by Congress in 1993 
as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act to fund a portion of the budget impact
of that legislation.4
The Treasury presently uses two mechanisms to collect
most business taxes:EFTPS and PATAX (Paper Tax System).
To appreciate how EFTPS contributes to the objectives of the
TT&L program,we first have to understand how PATAX,a
recent update of an older system,works.
A business that chooses to make a federal tax payment
with a conventional paper check prepares a “federal tax
deposit coupon” identifying itself and the amount of the 
payment and delivers the coupon and the check to its 
depository institution.Upon receipt,the institution debits
the customer’s checking account and credits an interest-free
Treasury tax collection account.(The depository institution
must pledge collateral to cover any balances in the collection
account in excess of insurance coverage.) The following day,
the accumulated balance in the collection account is trans-
ferred to a Treasury account at a Federal Reserve Bank (if the
institution is a collector institution) or to the Main Account
at the same institution (if the institution is a retainer or
investor institution).
A business enrolled in EFTPS makes a tax payment by
authorizing—via telephone or computer—withdrawal of
the payment from its account at a participating depository
institution on a specified future date.On the payment date,
the funds are withdrawn and transmitted to a Treasury
account at a Federal Reserve Bank via an automated clear-
inghouse (ACH) transfer.5If the participating institution is a
retainer or investor institution with sufficient free collateral
and room under its balance limit to accept additional funds,
the payment is immediately routed back to the institution’s
Main Account.EFTPS was first required for large business
taxpayers in the fall of 1996 and subsequently became
mandatory for any business making more than $200,000 
in aggregate annual tax payments.In fiscal year 2003,the
Table 3
Treasury Cash Balances,Treasury Tax and Loan Capacity,
and Funds Supplied through Federal Reserve Repurchase 




At Federal Federal  Aggregate Federal 
Reserve Reserve  TT&L  Reserve
Date Total Banks Banks Capacity RPs
4/17/00 67.5 11.4 56.1 59.9 21.7
4/18 48.1 8.7 39.5 59.6 18.7
4/19 59.7 5.7 54.1 59.4 23.8
4/20 33.8 8.0 25.8 55.4 15.1
4/21 45.2 8.3 37.0 55.9 16.1
4/24 73.9 8.2 65.7 70.9 17.0
4/25 91.4 16.4 75.0 77.5 23.3
4/26 105.6 29.4 76.1 77.5 39.8
4/27 77.9 6.0 71.9 77.8 18.5
4/28 92.6 15.9 76.7 77.8 24.9
5/1 83.4 17.3 66.1 77.8 31.2
5/2 98.0 22.2 75.8 77.8 28.5
5/3 80.4 8.0 72.4 77.8 32.5
5/4 78.3 6.0 72.2 77.9 16.0
5/5 77.6 5.1 72.5 77.8 13.0
Source:Federal Reserve Bank of New York.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 7
federal government collected almost $1.5 trillion through
EFTPS—far more than the $76 billion collected through
PATAX during the same year.
The substitution of electronic payments for paper-based
payments has led to three major improvements in the TT&L
program:
● The reduction in the volume of payments held overnight
in interest-free collection accounts increased the average
return on aggregate Treasury balances.
● The reduced use of paper coupons and paper checks led
to lower processing costs.
● Electronic notification of pending payments allowed the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve to replace imperfect
forecasts of those payments with data on actual flows.
The last improvement enhanced the ability of the Treasury
and Federal Reserve staffs to forecast,and thus to control,
Treasury balances at Federal Reserve Banks. The average
daily absolute forecast error for closing Treasury balances
fell from about $600 million in the late 1990s to about 
$400 million more recently (Chart 4).(Forecast errors have
not disappeared entirely because cash managers still have to
forecast most disbursements and some receipts.)
An Innovation in Stabilizing Treasury Balances 
at Federal Reserve Banks
In July 2000,the Treasury and the Federal Reserve imple-
mented the Treasury Investment Program (TIP),a major
revamping of TT&L infrastructure that centralized,at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis,many of the functions
previously carried out by individual Federal Reserve Banks.
The consolidated functions included tracking Main Account
and Special Direct Investment account balances,monitoring
collateral pledges, and investing and calling Treasury 
balances.
TIP allowed Treasury cash managers to monitor,for the
first time,certain transfers to the Treasury’s Reserve Bank
accounts on a very nearly real-time basis and to neutralize
errors in forecasting those transfers.Since the introduction
of EFTPS,the four most important categories of tax-related
transfers to the Treasury’s Reserve Bank accounts have been
(1) ACH transfers (through EFTPS) from collector institu-
tions,(2) transfers from lockbox facilities,(3) PATAX pay-
ments from collector institutions,and (4) transfers of excess
balances from retainer and investor institutions. On any
given day, all transfers in the first category—and a large 
portion of the transfers in the second category—are known
before the 9:00 a.m.conference call between the Treasury
and New York Fed staffs and are incorporated in the decision
to invest or call in balances.6 Transfers in the third and
fourth categories,however,have to be forecast.7If the sum of
the transfers in the third and fourth categories comes in
above the forecast level, the Treasury balance at Federal
Reserve Banks will exceed the target balance,reserves in the
private banking system may be undesirably scarce,and the
federal funds rate may rise above its target level.
A TIP facility called Dynamic Investment neutralizes
errors in forecasting PATAX payments from collector insti-
tutions and transfers of excess balances from retainer and
investor institutions (hereafter,collectively denoted as “pay-
ments”) by recycling Treasury balances back to private deposi-
tory institutions on an intradaybasis.In a representative case,
Treasury cash managers might set the initial value of the
“Balance Available for Dynamic Investment”—an index
coded in the TIP software,hereafter the “Balance”—equal to
$200 million less the forecast payments.Actual payments are
added to the Balance as they come in.For example,if pay-
ments are expected to be $500 million, the initial Balance
might be set at -$300 million.If $250 million of payments
come in by 11 a.m.,the updated Balance will be -$50 million.
Once an hour between noon and 5 p.m.,any positive Balance
is moved to the Main Accounts at participating institutions
and the recycled funds are subtracted from the Balance,
thereby resetting the Balance for the next hour.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes: Let e   be the forecast error for day k, computed as the difference between the 
closing balance in the Treasury’s Reserve Bank accounts at the end of day k and the 
simple average of the forecasts of that balance generated in the morning of the same
day by Treasury cash managers and staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The average absolute forecast error for day k was computed as the average of the 
absolute values of the errors for day k and the preceding 249 days:   
Chart 4
Average Daily Absolute Forecast Error for Closing Treasury 
Balances in Federal Reserve Banks
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i=0 Σ e   k-i /250.If actual payments cumulate over the course of the day to
the originally forecast value of $500 million,$200 million
will be transferred to private depository institutions through
the Dynamic Investment facility.(To ensure that the supply
of bank reserves is not affected by an accurate forecast,
this expected $200 million of Dynamic Investments is offset
by a $200 million larger call,or smaller direct investment,
at the 9:00 a.m. conference call.) If actual payments are
unexpectedly large,additional funds will be transferred to 
private institutions. For example, if actual payments are
$650 million instead of the $500 million originally fore-
cast,then $350 million will be transferred to private institu-
tions,including $200 million of expected transfers and an
additional,unexpected transfer of $150 million (Table 4,
column 2). The latter transfer offsets the reserve drain 
associated with the unexpectedly large volume of payments.
In this way,Dynamic Investment neutralizes any larger than
expected payments that might otherwise lead to an undesir-
able scarcity of reserves in the banking system.
Conversely,if actual payments are unexpectedly small,a
smaller than expected volume of funds will be transferred
to private institutions through the Dynamic Investment
facility.For example,if actual payments are $350 million
instead of the $500 million originally forecast,only $50 mil-
lion (rather than $200 million) will be transferred (Table 4,
column 3).The $150 million shortfall in transfers offsets the
unexpected retention of $150 million of reserves at private
institutions. Thus, the Dynamic Investment facility acts 
as an automatic stabilizer in maintaining the Treasury’s
Reserve Bank balance at the target level.
Chart 5 shows the quantity of funds returned unexpect-
edly to the private banking system through Dynamic
Investment as a result of forecasting errors. The quantity 
of funds returned unexpectedly is positive on days when
payments and transfers were larger than forecast at the start
of the day; it is negative on days when payments and trans-
fers fell short of initial forecasts.Although Treasury and Fed
forecasts were quite accurate on many days,there were some
days when payments and transfers were materially stronger
or weaker than expected and neutralization of forecast
errors proved valuable.
An Innovation in Interest Rate Determination
The Term Investment Option is an investment facility first
offered to depository institutions on a pilot basis in the
spring of 2002 and on a broader basis beginning in
November 2003. TIO addresses a particularly vexatious
issue: how the interest rate on Treasury balances at private
depository institutions should be determined. (Box 1
describes the problems the Treasury encountered when it
tried to change that interest rate in the late 1990s.) The new
facility has two novel features:it provides for a competitively
determined interest rate and it offers greater certainty about
the length of time funds will be left on deposit.The latter
feature is believed to be particularly important in attracting
institutions to the TIO program.
The easiest way to explain how TIO works is through 
an example. On Tuesday, January 13, 2004, the Treasury
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 10, NUMBER 11
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Table 4
Dynamic Investment as a Function of PATAX Payments
from Collector Institutions and Transfers of Excess
Balances from Retainer and Investor Institutions
Payments Unexpectedly Unexpectedly
as Expected High Payments Low Payments 
Payments 500 650 350
Dynamic Investment:
Equal to payments net 
of -$300 million initial 
value of Balance Available 
for Dynamic Investment 200 350 50
Net amount transferred to Treasury
accounts at Federal Reserve Banks:
Payments,less amount invested
through Dynamic Investment,
plus $200 million larger morning
call or smaller direct investment  500 500 500
Notes:In all three cases,Treasury cash managers expect $500 million in payments.
They set the Balance Available for Dynamic Investment at an initial value of
-$300 million and,to offset the expected $200 million of Dynamic Investments 
during the day,either add $200 million to the morning call or invest $200 million
less in the morning’s direct investment.PATAX payments are those made under the
Paper Tax System.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Chart 5














announced that it would auction,on the following day,$9 bil-
lion for deposit for nineteen days,from Thursday,January 15,
to Tuesday,February 3.8 On January 14,participating institu-
tions bid for the funds through an Internet application
known as TERMLink, indicating the maximum rate they
would pay on a specified quantity of funds.Following the
close of bidding at 11 a.m.,Treasury officials determined that
they could place $9 billion with institutions bidding rates 
of 0.961 percent or higher. All successful bids were filled 
at 0.961 percent—that is, the auction used a single-price 
format.Bids that specified higher rates were filled in full.Bids
that specified exactly 0.961 percent were prorated—because
at that rate,bidding interest exceeded the amount of funds
available after the full awards to the higher-rate bids were
accounted for. Institutions that bid the 0.961 percent rate
received 57.50 percent of the amount bid for.
The Treasury sponsored a total of forty-two TIO auctions
through the end of April 2004.(Details on TIO offerings and
auction results are available at <http://www.fms.treas.gov/
tip/>.) The initial offerings were relatively small ($2 billion
to $5 billion,consistent with the notion of a pilot program),
but offerings became larger after mid-2003.The largest was
a $14 billion offering in December 2003.Terms varied from
as few as three days to as many as nineteen days.
Chart 6 shows the variation in TIO balances and aggre-
gate Treasury balances at private depository institutions
through the end of 2003.The Treasury made term invest-
ments during twelve separate intervals,holding between one
and four auctions in each interval.Term investments were
made during the second half of a month and in the first few
days of the following month—times when the Treasury is
typically flush with cash.
The TIO program materially enhanced the return on
public funds invested at private institutions.Over the first
forty-two auctions,the difference between auction rates and
what the Treasury would have earned had it left the balances
in Main Accounts (earning interest at the weekly average 
federal funds rate less 25 basis points) was uniformly posi-
tive and averaged 17.3 basis points. Box 3 examines TIO
auction results in more detail (see page 10).
The Term Investment Option was an important innova-
tion for two reasons.First,it changed the locus of interest
rate determination for Treasury investments from admin-
istrative discretion to a market-driven auction process.
Treasury officials now have an unambiguous measure of the
value placed on TIO balances by different depository institu-
tions,and the balances can be directed to the institutions
that value them most highly.Second,the new program has
led Treasury officials to consider whether they can commit a
portion of their cash balances to term investments.Not sur-
prisingly,market participants have been quick to appreciate
the information content of TIO offering announcements for
projecting Treasury borrowing requirements.9
Conclusion
The Treasury Tax and Loan program is a cooperative effort
of the U.S.Treasury and the Federal Reserve System that is
important for both monetary policy and Treasury cash man-
agement.This article described three recent innovations that
have enhanced the ability of Treasury and Federal Reserve
officials to achieve the primary objectives of the program:
dampening fluctuations in bank reserves,processing federal
tax payments, and earning a market rate of interest on
investments of public funds.
Of the three innovations,the Electronic Federal Tax Pay-
ment System offers the most obvious benefits.EFTPS has
reduced the cost of processing business tax payments by
replacing paper checks with electronic transfers,enhanced
the return on public funds by reducing the amount of
money held overnight in interest-free collection accounts,
and allowed cash managers to replace imperfect forecasts of
some tax payments with data on actual flows. A second
innovation, Dynamic Investment, acts as an automatic 
stabilizer, keeping the Treasury’s Reserve Bank balance
closer to the target level. The third innovation, the Term
Investment Option,has changed the locus of interest rate
determination to a market-driven auction process and gen-
erated,on average,an additional 17 basis points of yield on
TIO balances.
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury Statement,
<http://www.fms.treas.gov/dts>. 
Chart 6
Term Investment Option Balances and Treasury Cash Balances
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One of the key issues in the Term Investment Option program
is how interest rates on TIO balances compare with rates on
Main Account balances. This box examines the variation in the
spread between TIO auction rates and Main Account rates in
the program’s first forty-two auctions, which took place
between April 2002 and April 2004. 
Let Rtiok denote the rate from the kth auction (in percent), Qk
the size of the kth offering (in billions of dollars), Tk the term of
the kth offering (in days), and Ak the time elapsed (in decimal
years) between the first auction and the kth auction. Let Rmaink
denote the average rate on Main Account balances over the same
interval as the kth offering. Regressing the interest rate differen-
tial Rtiok   Rmaink on Qk, Tk, and Akgivesa
Rtiok   Rmaink= 0.1037   0.0109   Qk   0.0049   Tk + 0.0632  Ak
(0.0228) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0122)
(1) standard error of estimate = 0.039
R-squared = 0.4277
42 observations
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are shown
in parentheses. All of the coefficients are significantly different
from zero at a 95 percent confidence level. The estimates sug-
gest that an offering of $6 billion for fifteen days in January
2004 would have attracted an interest rate about 22 basis points
above the Main Account rate. (The expected value of Rtiok  
Rmaink is 0.22 percent when Qk = 6.0, Tk = 15, and Ak = 1.75.)
Longer-term offerings generally attracted relatively higher rates
(each additional day raised the spread by about 0.5 basis point)
and larger offerings attracted relatively lower rates (each addi-
tional billion dollars reduced the spread by about 1.1 basis
points).b In addition, the spread widened at a rate of about 
6 basis points per year as the TIO program evolved from a pilot
effort to a regular feature of the Treasury cash management 
system.
The positive coefficient on Tk in equation 1 shows that 
bidders paid relatively higher rates for longer-term balances.
Box 3
The Rate of Interest on Term Investment Option Balances
aThere were two unusual auctions in the data set. The third auction in December 2002 offered $3 billion but attracted bids for only $1.1 bil-
lion. The auction in December 2003 was covered but attracted unusually weak bids. The regression results are not materially different when
these two offerings are withheld from the data set.
bWe examined whether the existence of outstanding TIO balances had a similarly depressing effect. Let AOBk denote the quantity of TIO
balances already outstanding at the time of the kth auction. Adding AOBk to equation 1 resulted in an estimated coefficient that was not 
significantly different from zero. The lower auction rates associated with larger offerings thus appear to be a matter of the offerings them-
selves and not of the total amount of TIO balances that would be outstanding following placement of the offered funds. This finding 
suggests that the Treasury might get better rates with frequent small offerings than with less frequent large offerings.
cWe did not observe directly the RP rate over the same term as a given TIO offering, but we did have data on rates on repurchase agreements
that began on the day of a TIO auction and matured one business day later; one, two, and three weeks later; and one, two, and three months
later. We fit a cubic spline to the data we had and identified from the spline the rate on a repurchase agreement ending on the day the TIO
offering was to mature. We then identified the forward RP rate over the same term as the TIO offering from the one-business-day RP rate
and the term rate identified from the spline. The identified forward RP rate for the kth TIO auction is our estimate of Rpk.
However, the willingness of bidders to pay for longer-
dated TIO balances was not different from the willingness of
borrowers to pay for longer-dated funds from other sources. Let
Rpk denote the rate on a repurchase agreement on Treasury col-
lateral for the same term as the kth TIO offering observed on the
day of the kth auction.c Regressing the interest rate differential
Rtiok   Rpk on Qk, Tk, and Ak gives
Rtiok  Rpk= -0.0372   0.0123  Qk  0.0017  Tk + 0.0567  Ak
(0.0272) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0145)
(2) standard error of estimate = 0.047
R-squared = 0.3465
42 observations
The insignificant coefficient on Tk implies that the variation
of TIO auction rates as a function of term was about the same as
the variation of RP rates as a function of term. The coefficients
on Qk and Ak are about the same as the coefficients on those two
variables in equation 1. Spreads between TIO auction rates and
RP rates tended to be algebraically smaller (less positive or
more negative) the larger an offering and tended to become
algebraically larger (more positive or less negative) as the TIO
program evolved.
Equation 2 also suggests that the Treasury was not far from
the mark when it proposed in 1999 (see Box 1) to change the
Treasury Tax and Loan rate from the federal funds rate less 
25 basis points to the RP rate. The estimated coefficients imply
that an offering of $6 billion for fifteen days in January 2004
would have attracted an interest rate not materially different
from the contemporaneous rate on fifteen-day repurchase
agreements. (From equation 2, the expected value of Rtiok   Rpk
is 0.01 percent when Qk = 6.0, Tk = 15, and Ak = 1.75.) On
average over all forty-two auctions, the difference between TIO
auction rates and rates on repurchase agreements with compa-
rable terms was -1.7 basis points.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 11
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1. Between 1974 and 1978,the Treasury did maintain a large fraction of its
balances at Federal Reserve Banks and the Fed was forced to intervene 
frequently.See Brockschmidt (1975),McDonough (1976),Lovett (1978),and
Lang (1979).
2. The origins and early evolution of the TT&L program are sketched in
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (1973),Brockschmidt (1975),Lovett (1978),
and Lang (1979).See also Chapman (1923).The TT&L program is described in
the Code of Federal Regulations,Title 31,Part 203 (“Payment of Federal Taxes
and the Treasury Tax and Loan Program”) and Part 380 (“Collateral
Acceptability and Valuation”), Federal Reserve Bank Operating Circular 8
(“Collateral”) and Operating Circular 9 (“Federal Tax Payments and Treasury
Tax and Loan Depositaries”),and the Treasury Financial Manual.
3. See U.S.Department of the Treasury,Collateral Release no.26,September
2001,available at <http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/gsr/gsr082001colrelease
.htm>, and U.S. Department of the Treasury, Collateral Margins Table,
effective September 30, 2002, available at <ftp://ftp.publicdebt.treas.gov/
gsr202marginstable.pdf>.
4. See U.S.House Committee (1993,pp.4,88,105-6,163-5,and 170).EFTPS is
described in Financial Institution Handbook for EFTPS, available at <http://
www.fms.treas.gov/eftps/eftpshandbook.pdf>.
5. Alternatively,a taxpayer can direct a same-daytransfer offunds through the
Federal Reserve Electronic Tax Application (FR-ETA). See Making EFTPS
Same-Day Federal Tax Payments,available at <http://www.frbservices.org/
Treasury/pdf/Sameday.pdf>.
6. ACH payments are known from taxpayer-initiated EFTPS transfer autho-
rizations submitted earlier.Lockbox facilities generally advise the Treasury
each morning of the balances to be transferred that day.
7. Transfers of excess balances from retainer and investor institutions can be
forecast more accurately since the introduction of EFTPS because knowledge
of pending ACH payments to those institutions has led to improved forecasts
of excess balances at the same institutions.
8. With a few exceptions, TIO deposits must be secured with the same 
types of assets that can be used to secure Main Account balances. See
<http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/gsr/gsrcltio.htm>.
9. For example,on May 14,2004,the daily commentary by Wrightson ICAP
(available at <http://www.wrightson.com/treasury/commentary/finance/
2004/05/14/>) observed that “the Treasury once again kept its 3- and 6-month
bill auction unchanged at $33 billion.We had originally expected the weekly
offerings to have reached $36 billion by this point in the quarter.However,the
Treasury’s cash flow has been stronger than we expected,and the Treasury
clearly expects that trend to continue.The Treasury’s confidence in its near-
term cash flow prospects can be seen in its decision yesterday to place an 
additional $6 billion in a TT&L Term Investment Operation starting on
Monday.With $6 billion locked away in a TIO,our projections suggest that the
Treasury won’t have enough remaining cash on hand to keep its Fed account at
the $5 billion target.Needless to say,the Treasury would not have committed
the funds to the TIO unless the information available to it indicated that it
would have an adequate cushion in its cash balance.”
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